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1 Introduction
The advent of the euro has generated a substantial body of research investigating the
consequences and effects of the introduction of the common currency in Europe.1 Topics
of particular interest include integration and co-movement of bond and stock markets
(Kool, 2000; Morana and Beltratti, 2002; Billio and Pellizon, 2003; Bartram et al., 2004;
Guiso et al., 2004), convergence of real exchange rates (Lopez and Papell, in press) and
of inflation rates (Honohan and Lane, 2003), trade effects (Micco et al., 2003; Bun and
Klaassen, 2004), product market integration (Engel and Rogers, 2004), foreign exchange
rate risk exposure of individual firms (Bartram and Karolyi, 2003), the behavior of nominal
exchange rates of euro-zone countries in the run-up to the common currency (Fro¨mmel and
Menckhoff, 2001; Bond and Najand, 2002; Fro¨mmel, 2004), and the role of the euro in the
foreign exchange market (Detken and Hartmann, 2002; Hau et al., 2002). Not surprisingly,
most of this research focuses on the effects for countries that have adopted the common
currency. The exceptions include Barr et al. (2003), Micco et al. (2003) and Guiso et al.
(2004), who (also) examine the effects of the euro introduction on European countries that
held on to their own currency. The analysis in these papers considers variables such as
trade and foreign direct investment, which obviously are closely linked to the exchange
rate. However, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of the euro introduction on the
properties of exchange rates themselves has not been investigated before for European
countries outside the euro-zone. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap. In particular, we
consider the behavior of daily exchange rates of the Swiss franc, British pound, Norwegian
krone, and Swedish krona against the US dollar over the period from January 1, 1994
until December 31, 2003.2 We concentrate on the volatility and correlation properties of
these exchange rates, paying particular attention to the co-movement with the euro (and
its predecessor the ECU) and changes therein.
The analysis is performed in the framework of the dynamic conditional correlation
1Since January 1, 1999 the euro replaced the national currencies of 11 countries: Belgium, Germany,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. On January
1, 2001 it also replaced the national currency of Greece. These 12 countries are now known collectively as
the euro area.
2We do not include the Danish krone in the analysis. Denmark decided not to adopt the euro upon its
introduction already in December 1992, a decision that was confirmed in the national referendum held on
September 28, 2000. Nevertheless, it turns out that the correlation of the Danish krone with the euro has
been very close to perfect ever since the euro came into existence on January 1, 1999. Also, Greece is not
considered, although it adopted the euro only two years after its initial introduction.
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(DCC) model introduced by Engle (2002), which we extend to allow for structural changes
in the unconditional correlations. We find that such breaks occurred both at the time the
formal decision to proceed with the euro was made in December 1996 and at the time of
the actual introduction of the euro in January 1999. In particular, we document that most
correlations were substantially lower during the intermittent period. Breaks also occurred
in the unconditional exchange rate volatilities, but these were of a much smaller magnitude
comparatively.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the ‘road to the euro’,
highlighting the most important exchange rate policy decisions made by the governments
and central bank authorities of the outside countries. We describe the daily exchange
rate series in Section 3. In Section 4, we develop the extended DCC models allowing for
structural breaks in unconditional volatilities and correlations. In Section 5, we discuss
the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The introduction of the euro
In this section we provide an overview of the crucial decisions taken in the process towards
the introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999. This includes the main actions taken
by the governments and central bank authorities of not only the countries that decided
to adopt the common currency, but also European Union (EU) members that decided to
stay outside ‘euroland’ (UK and Sweden) and countries that did not belong to the EU in
the first place (Norway and Switzerland).3
Countries in Europe have long been passionate with the objective of reducing intra-
currency variability by means of increased policy coordination. On March 13, 1979, a
new process to achieve this goal was started with the creation of the European Monetary
System (EMS). The key ingredient of the EMS was the European Currency Unit (ECU),
defined as a ‘basket’ of fixed quantities of the currencies of the Member States. The value
of the ECU against the US dollar was determined as a weighted average of the US dollar
exchange rates of the component currencies. The ECU was intended to function as the
numeraire of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), implying that the central rates of the
participating currencies were expressed in terms of the ECU. The ECU central rates were
3This section draws upon information available at the websites of the Euro-
pean Council (http://ue.eu.int/), the ECB (http://www.ecb.int/), the Norges Bank
(http://www.norgesbank.no/), the Swiss National Bank (http://www.nationalbank.ch/), the Bank of
England (http://www.bankofengland.uk/), and the Swedish Riksbank (http://www.riksbanken.se/).
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then used to determine the bilateral ERM central rates around which intervention rates
were fixed.
The EMS was in fact much more than just an exchange rate mechanism. It also involved
the adjustment of monetary and economic policies as tools for achieving exchange rate
stability. Its participants were able to create a zone in which monetary stability increased
and capital controls were gradually relaxed. It thus fostered a downward convergence
of inflation rates and stimulated a high degree of exchange rate stability, which led to
an improvement in overall economic performance, for example through protecting intra-
European trade from excessive exchange rate uncertainty.
In June 1988 the European Council confirmed the objective of the progressive realiza-
tion of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The Delors committee, which subsequently
was mandated to study and propose concrete stages leading to this union, suggested that
EMU should be achieved in three discrete but evolutionary steps. Stage One of EMU,
which began on July 1, 1990, involved abolishing all restrictions on capital movements be-
tween Member States, free use of the ECU, increased cooperation between central banks
and further coordination of monetary policies of the Member States with the aim of achiev-
ing price stability. The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community,
was revised in 1991 to enable Stages Two and Three of EMU. The resulting Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union was signed in Maastricht in February 1992 and after a prolonged ratification
process came into force in November 1993.
Stage Two of EMU was entered on January 1, 1994, with the establishment of the
European Monetary Institute (EMI). The two main tasks of the EMI were to strengthen
central bank cooperation and monetary policy coordination, and to make the necessary
preparations for establishing the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), for the con-
duct of the single monetary policy and for the creation of a single currency in the third
stage.4 The EMI itself had no responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy nor had
4In more detail, the EMI undertook (i) to prepare a range of instruments and procedures for the conduct
of monetary policy and to analyse potential monetary policy strategies, (ii) to promote the harmonisation of
the collection, compilation and distribution of euro-area statistics concerning money and banking, balance
of payments and other financial data, (iii) to develop the framework for conducting foreign exchange
operations as well as for holding and managing the official foreign exchange reserves of Member states,
(iv) to promote the efficiency of cross-border payment and securities settlement transactions, and (v) to
prepare the euro banknotes. Furthermore, for the establishment of the ESCB, the EMI specifically took on
the task of (i) elaborating harmonised accounting rules and standards to make it possible to construct a
consolidated balance sheet of the ESCB for internal and external reporting purposes, (ii) putting in place
the necessary information and communications systems support for the operational and policy functions
to be undertaken within the ESCB, and (iii) identifying the possible ways in which the ESCB would
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it any competence for carrying out foreign exchange intervention. In December 1995, the
European Council agreed upon the name of ‘euro’ for the single European currency to be
introduced at the start of Stage Three of EMU, and confirmed that this would take place
on January 1, 1999.
At its meeting held in Dublin on December 13-14, 1996, the European Council made
decisive progress towards the third stage of EMU. In particular, it agreed upon the struc-
ture of the new Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) and upon the principles and main
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact for ensuring budgetary discipline in EMU
countries. Both decisions were largely based upon a report presented by the EMI at the
meeting. Although the resulting resolutions on ERM II and the Stability and Growth
Pact were formally adopted at the European Council meeting in Amsterdam in June 1997,
the Dublin meeting in December 1996 can be regarded as the time the final decision to
proceed towards Stage Three of EMU and the introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999
was actually made.5
Upon the start of the third and final stage of EMU on January 1, 1999, the exchange
rates of the currencies of the 11 participating Member States were irrevocably fixed.6 The
European Central Bank took over responsibility for conducting the single monetary policy
in the euro area. Also, the ESCB, consisting of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
national central banks of the EU member states, started to operate. Both the intra-EU
exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and the Stability and Growth Pact entered into force.
And of course, last but not least, the single common currency was introduced.
2.1 Non-euro countries
2.1.1 UK
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, provided a special clause for the UK on the imple-
mentation in progressive stages of economic and monetary union. The British Government
accepted participation up to the preparatory Stage Two, but arranged an opt-out from
Stage Three, when exchange rates would be irrevocably locked, the euro would come into
contribute to the policies conducted by the competent supervisory authorities to foster the stability of
credit institutions and the financial system.
5Coincidentally, at the Dublin meeting the EMI also presented the winning designs for the euro ban-
knotes.
6In May 1998, it was decided that 11 Member states had fulfilled the conditions necessary for partici-
pation in the third stage of EMU and the adoption of the single currency on January 1, 1999. At the same
time it was also agreed that the ERM bilateral central rates would be used for determining the irrevocable
conversion rates for the euro.
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existence and the national currencies would be abolished.
In October 1997, the UK government set five economic tests that must be passed
before it will recommend that the UK joins the euro. In theory, these tests will be distinct
from any political decision to join. The tests are (i) Are business cycles and economic
structures compatible with European interest rates on a permanent basis? (ii) If problems
emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them? (iii) Would joining the euro create
better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in the UK? (iv) What
impact would entry into the euro have on the UK’s financial services industry? (v) Would
joining the euro promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs? The UK
government assessed these tests in October 1997 and June 2003, and decided on both
occasions that they had not all been passed.
These decisions are not surprising given the positive track record of the Bank of Eng-
land in its conduct of monetary policy. One of the core purposes of the Bank of England is
maintaining the integrity and value of monetary policy which is pursued primarily through
guarding price stability. In 1992, the Bank adopted a formal inflation target. According
to the institutional framework laid down in the 1998 Bank of England Act, the Bank
is required to set interest rates so as to maintain price stability and subject to that to
support the economic policy of the Government, including its objectives for growth and
employment. On the other hand, the Government is required to specify what its eco-
nomic objectives are, including what is meant by price stability. If inflation deviates from
target by more than 1%, the Governor is required to write to the Chancellor explaining
the circumstances and setting out what action the Monetary Policy Committee considers
necessary to return to target. In 1997, the Bank of England was granted operational inde-
pendence, which further enhanced the credibility of inflation targeting. Against the target
of 2.5% for RPIX (the short term interest rate) which ran from 1997 until December 2003,
average inflation was 2.4%. For 68 out of the 79 months, inflation was within 0.5 percent
of the target - below it for 42 months, above it for 30, and on target for the remaining
seven.
Although joining euro seems distant, since 1996, the Bank of England has been pub-
lishing technical information on the euro concerning two important aspects. First, the
evolution of the euro financial markets in practice and second, the technical financial sec-
tor preparations for potential UK entry to EMU.
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2.1.2 Sweden
On November 19, 1992, the Sveriges Riksbank (Swedish Central Bank) abandoned its
policy of pegging the value of the krona to a trade-weighted average of foreign currencies.
At the time, Sweden was neither a member of the EU nor participating in the European
system of pegged exchange rates, and therefore entering the ERM II was not feasible in
the near future. Neither were the experiences of money stock targeting in other countries
encouraging. Furthermore, the financial system was in the midst of a deep crisis, which
made the stability of money demand questionable and successful targeting of the money
stock unrealistic.
In this environment, on January 15, 1993 the Riksbank decided to declare that the flex-
ible exchange rate policy would be combined with an explicit target for inflation. Specifi-
cally, the Riksbank decided that from 1994 onwards there would be a target for Swedish
inflation of 2 percent per year, accompanied by a ‘tolerance interval’ of 1 percentage point,
defined in terms of the consumer price index (CPI).
In late 1998, the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) approved changes to the Riksbank Act
making the central bank more legally independent and formalizing objectives towards an
inflation-targeting regime. Sweden had to make the Riksbank more independent in order
to comply with the Maastricht Treaty, which Sweden in effect had signed when deciding
to become an EU member in December 1994. Although Sweden has not adopted the euro
and is therefore not a full participant in the EMU, there has been broad political support
in Sweden for the idea that technical and practical preparations should be made for a
possible future full membership. The parliament’s decision to make the Riksbank more
independent was taken before the government’s decision to postpone membership in the
EMU in December 1997. This timing was probably not co-incidental; legal independence
for the Riksbank was viewed as useful to maintain credibility for the inflation target as
long as Sweden is not a full member of the EMU.
Unlike the UK and Denmark, Sweden does not have a formal opt-out from the mon-
etary union and therefore must (in theory at least) convert to the euro at some point.
Notwithstanding this, on September 14, 2003 a referendum on the euro was held, the re-
sult of which was a rejection of the common currency by a 14 percentage point margin (56
to 42 percent, with 2 percent voting ‘blank’). The euro opponents claimed that adopt-
ing the common currency could damage the country’s strong economic performance and
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generous welfare system, especially since Sweden’s trade pattern and industrial structure
deviate from the European average. On the other hand, the euro advocates argued that
trade and future growth would be enhanced by becoming an ERM II member.
Despite the lack of an opt-out option, the Swedish government has argued that comply-
ing with the referendum result is possible given that one of the requirements for adopting
the euro is a prior two-year membership of ERM II. By simply choosing to stay outside the
exchange rate mechanism, the Swedish government is provided a formal loophole avoiding
the theoretical requirement of adopting the euro.
2.1.3 Norway
Monetary policy in Norway has been oriented towards maintaining exchange rate stability
for almost the entire post-World War II period. When the Bretton Woods system collapsed
in the early 1970s, Norway joined the currency ‘snake’.7 However, when the European
Monetary System (EMS) was set up in 1979 Norway chose to link its krone to a trade-
weighted basket of currencies.
In spite of the objective of a fixed exchange rate, several adjustments to the interna-
tional value of the krone were made during the 1970s and 1980s to compensate for the
loss of cost competitiveness due to high wage and price inflation. From the mid-1980s the
focus of monetary policy was increasingly shifted towards the role of a stable exchange
rate as a nominal anchor, against the backdrop of very high inflation and relatively high
domestic interest rates following the devaluation in 1986. The EU countries’ track record
of low inflation was used as an argument for pegging the krone rate to the ECU in 1990.
The currency turmoil in Europe in 1992-93 prompted Norway to abandon the fixed rate
against the ECU in favor of a ‘managed float’, now aiming at keeping the exchange rate
‘stable’ against European currencies, but with no fluctuation margins. A drastic change
in Norwegian exchange rate policy was made on January 10, 1997 as monetary authorities
decided to discontinue the interventions that had been necessary to stabilize the Norwegian
krone exchange rate.
Petroleum activity constitutes an important part of the Norwegian economy. Oil and
7Prior to the collapse, the fluctuation band in the Bretton Woods system was widened to ±2.25%.
Following this, the European Community (EC) currencies could fluctuate against each other by as much
as 9%. In order to stabilize the exchange rates within the EC, a European currency system was therefore
established in 1972. It reduced the overall fluctuation band between the EC currencies to 4.5%. This
system was known as the ‘snake’ as the exchange rates could ‘slither’ between the margins fixed by the
Bretton Woods system.
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gas account for the largest share of Norwegian exports. In 1998, the world economy was hit
by the financial crisis in Asia, Russia and Brazil, falling commodity prices and widespread
unrest in international financial markets. The Asian crisis proved to be more serious and
prolonged than envisaged, and the contagion effects were more severe than most observers
had anticipated. Weaker global demand contributed to a sharp fall in commodity prices,
which in turn had a severe impact on commodity-based economies such as Norway. The
terms of trade worsened and the krone exchange rate depreciated substantially; see also
Farooq Akram (2004) for recent evidence on the sensitivity of the krone to the oil price.
The Norwegian krone was down sharply from around 101 against the ECU at the beginning
of 1998 to 115 in October, the weakest rate since the objective of exchange rate stability
against the ECU was adopted. Norges Bank (the Norwegian Central Bank) responded
by raising its key interest rates in several steps in 1998. These rates were first raised in
March after the krone weakened against the ECU during the first three months of the year.
The krone then appreciated slightly and stabilized for a period, but pressure on the krone
increased again during the summer. Norges Bank responded by raising interest rates on
six further occasions. Following the last increase on August 25, the deposit rate and the
overnight lending rate were 8% and 10%, respectively, or 4.5% higher than at the beginning
of 1998. Norges Bank intervened to support the krone for the equivalent of NOK 29 billion
in the period mid-October to mid-December. It was thought necessary to defend the krone
through interventions in order to prevent a self-reinforcing and unnecessary weakening of
the currency. Subsequently it was realized that the fluctuations in the exchange rate
actually were amplified as a result of speculation, hedging and portfolio shifts in financial
markets.
On March 29, 2001, the Government approved a new operational target for monetary
policy. Norges Bank sets the key interest rate with a view to maintaining low and stable
inflation. The inflation target is set at 2.5%. Under the inflation targeting regime, Norges
Bank no longer has a specific exchange rate target for the Norwegian krone.
2.1.4 Switzerland
Monetary policy in Switzerland has a long history of being autonomous, with the overrid-
ing objective to preserve long-term price stability ever since the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system. Convinced that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) opted for a strategy aimed at a steady growth of the money stock in line
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with the potential growth rate of the economy. Only in 2000 this was changed to inflation
targeting. Since 1973, the Swiss franc has been floating against all major currencies. De-
spite the flexible exchange rate regime, the Swiss franc has been remarkably stable against
other European currencies ever since the early 1980s. Given that the SNB refrained from
intervening in the foreign exchange market, this quasi-fixed exchange rate was achieved
by market forces alone. Effectively, the stability was due to convergence in economic
fundamentals and similarities in monetary policy.
In the run-up towards the introduction of the euro, the SNB expressed concerns about
the stability of the Swiss franc, about the ability of the Swiss to conduct an independent
monetary policy, about the exchange rate sensitivity of the Swiss economy, and about the
position of the Swiss franc as a transaction currency (even in Switzerland itself). The SNB
implemented a pragmatic monetary policy aimed towards granting the Swiss economy the
monetary flexibility necessary for handling these risks and uncertainties. On December
11, 1998, the SNB Governing Board, in agreement with the Federal Government, decided
to continue this policy in 1999 during Stage Three of EMU. After the launch of the euro,
it soon appeared that the Swiss’ fears did not materialize: The Swiss franc remained very
stable against the euro, the SNB managed to hold on to its monetary independence, and
the Swiss franc was not crowded out by the euro.
Summarizing the above, our main conclusion is that the two most important events
in the run-up towards Stage Three of EMU were the agreement on the structure of the
new Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) and on the principles and main elements of the
Stability and Growth Pact at the meeting of the European Council in Dublin on December
13-14, 1996 and the actual introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999.
The Dublin meeting provided crucial information as to which countries committed
themselves to take further steps towards economic and monetary unification. On the one
hand, this event might have been perceived as a positive signal that the euro project was
really moving towards success and the birth of euro as common currency was a matter
of ‘when’, not a matter of ‘if’. On the other hand, the exclusion of the UK, Sweden and
Denmark with their successful economic and monetary records relative to other European
countries, might have raised further doubts about the euro project. This view was par-
ticularly shared by those already skeptical of the euro as a single currency, believing that
joining euro would further constrain growth and welfare of the participating countries,
and therefore the euro should and would never come into existence. These two camps,
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the euro-advocates and the euro-sceptics, which had polarized already before the ERM II,
were then even more divised. This situation might have resulted in more disparate views
held by both market participants and policy makers. In turn, these dissenting opinions
might have led to more heterogeneity in the monetary and financial decisions taken by
both investors and governments and central banks, particularly related to the exchange
rates. Consequently, we could expect that the correlations among currencies of the coun-
tries, regardless whether they are in or out of ERM II, would be weakened by the decisions
made at the EC meeting in Dublin in December 1996.
The second event, the formal euro introduction on January 1, 1999, confirmed that
the EMU was indeed a viable project. After the launch of the euro, opinions among mar-
ket participants and policy makers on the euro became less diverse as the uncertainty
of whether the euro would come into existence or not had been eliminated, despite the
continuing opposition from the euro-sceptics group. As a result, the monetary and fi-
nancial decisions related to the euro and non-euro currencies, performed by investors and
governments/central banks are expected to be more concerted compared to those taken
during the intermittent period. Consequently, we could expect that after the actual euro
introduction, the correlations among euro and non-euro currencies would be strengthened
again.
3 Data
We consider daily exchange rates of the Swiss franc (CHF), euro (EUR), British pound
(GBP), Norwegian krone (NOK), and Swedish krona (SEK) against the US dollar over the
period from January 1, 1994 (the start of Stage Two of EMU) until December 31, 2003
(2544 observations). Up to December 31, 1998, the euro series actually concerns the ECU
exchange rate, while the euro exchange rate is used as of January 1, 1999.8 The data is
obtained from the ECB website and concerns the reference rates that are based on the
regular daily concertation procedure between central banks within and outside the ESCB,
which normally takes place at 2.15 p.m. ECB time (CET).
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the daily exchange rate returns. In addition
to the full sample period, we also report these statistics for the three relevant subperiods
8We acknowledge that the British pound and Swedish krona were part of the ECU, which potentially
affects our results. We address this concern by repeating the entire empirical analysis using the German
Deutschmark instead of the ECU for the pre-euro period, which leads to qualitatively and quantitatively
similar findings.
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that we distinguish. The first period runs from January 1, 1994 until December 14, 1996,
when the formal decision to proceed with ERM II and the euro was made at the European
Summit in Dublin. The second subperiod comprises the period between this decision and
the actual introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999. The third and final subperiod
covers the remainder of the sample period until December 31, 2003.
Apart from the important economic events that took place at the end of 1996 and 1998,
the choice for these three subperiods is also motivated by the results from the following
nonparametric analysis of volatilities and correlations. Let rt denote the (N × 1) vector
time series of daily exchange rate returns, where in our case N = 5. A nonparametric
estimate of the correlation matrix Rt at t = τ can be obtained as
R̂(τ) = Q̂∗(τ)−1Q̂(τ)Q̂∗(τ)−1 (1)
where Q̂(τ) is the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator
Q̂(τ) =
∑T




where r = 1
T
∑T
t=1 rt, Kh(·) = (1/h)K(·/h), K is a kernel function and h a bandwidth
parameter, and where Q̂∗(τ) is diagonal matrix with the square roots of the diagonal
elements of Q̂(τ) on its diagonal. These also provide nonparametric estimates of the
volatilities of the exchange rate returns at t = τ .9 We employ a quartic kernel function
with bandwidth h = 1. The resulting volatility and correlation estimates, shown in Figure
1, are used in the discussion below.
Concerning the univariate statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis),
we first of all note that the mean exchange rate return varied considerably. Specifically,
during the middle period from December 16, 1996 until December 31, 1998 the US dollar
depreciated against all currencies (except the British pound), while the first and third
subperiods are characterized by appreciation of the US dollar. The standard deviation
of exchange rate returns remained relatively stable across subperiods, although it can be
observed that all currencies except the SEK experienced somewhat lower volatility between
1996 and 1999, see also panel (a) in Figure 1. More variation is observed in skewness and
kurtosis. Skewness is negative for all exchange rates and subperiods, except for the British
pound and Norwegian krone between December 1996 and January 1999. For the Swiss
9A detailed discussion of this type of nonparametric volatility and correlation estimates can be found
in Hafner, van Dijk and Franses (2005).
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franc, the euro and the Norwegian krone, the absolute magnitude of the skewness declined
over time. For the British pound, skewness was smaller during the second subperiod,
while for the Swedish krona the reverse pattern is found. Similar patterns are found for
the kurtosis.
Turning to the correlations, when computed over the full sample period these are quite
high, ranging between 0.530 for the British pound and Swedish krona to 0.925 for the
Swiss franc and the euro. Comparing the correlations during the three subperiods and
inspecting panels (b)-(f) of Figure 1, we observe that all correlations among CHF, EUR,
GBP and NOK decreased around the end of 1996, when the formal decision concerning
the euro was taken and Norway changed its exchange rate policy. Around the time of the
actual introduction of the euro in January 1999, these correlations increased again. For
the CHF, EUR and GBP, correlations in fact appear to have returned to their pre-1997
levels, while correlations of these exchange rates with the NOK remained somewhat below
this initial level. Correlations of the Swedish krona with the other exchange rates show
a different pattern, in the sense that they steadily and monotonically became higher in
consecutive subperiods (except for the GBP-SEK correlation, which was lower between
December 1996 and January 1999).
In the next section, we describe the framework of dynamic conditional correlation
models. In particular, we extend the model to allow for the possibility of structural breaks
in the unconditional correlations, in order to accommodate the substantial differences in
co-movement of the daily exchange rate returns documented above.
4 Dynamic conditional correlation models
Let rt denote the (N ×1) vector time series of daily exchange rate returns. Assuming that
rt is conditionally normal with mean µt = (µ1t, . . . , µNt)
′ and covariance matrix Ht, we
have the generic model
rt|Ft−1 ∼ N(µt, Ht), (3)
where Ft is the information set that includes all information up to and including time t.
The conditional covariance matrix Ht can be decomposed as
Ht = StRtSt, (4)
where St = diag(σ1t, . . . , σNt) is a diagonal matrix with the conditional standard deviations
σit, i = 1, . . . , N on the diagonal. The matrix Rt, with the (i, j)-th element denoted as
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ρijt, is the possibly time-varying conditional correlation matrix.
We assume that σ2it can be adequately described by a univariate GARCH(1,1) model
(see Bollerslev, 1986), such that





where εit = rit − µit, ωi > 0, αi > 0, βi ≥ 0 and αi + βi < 1, for i = 1, . . . , N .
10. The
unconditional volatility of the unexpected returns εit implied by the GARCH(1,1) model
is equal to ωi/(1− αi − βi) ≡ σ
2
i . Hence, (5) can be rewritten as







Engle and Mezrich (1996) developed the idea of volatility targeting, which essentially









it, with T denoting the sample size, in the estimation of the
remaining parameters αi and βi. This ensures that the unconditional volatility as implied
by the model equals the sample variance of εit.
For the conditional correlation matrix Rt we employ the dynamic conditional correla-
tion (DCC) model introduced by Engle (2002). A very similar model has been proposed
by Tse and Tsui (2002). Defining zt = S
−1
t εt, Rt is assumed to vary according to a
GARCH-type process,11
Qt = (1− γ − δ)Q+ γzt−1z
′






where Q∗t is a diagonal matrix composed of the square roots of the diagonal elements of Qt,
γ and δ are scalars, and Q = E[ztz
′
t] is the unconditional covariance matrix of standardized
shocks zt.
10Given that our empirical application involves exchange rate returns, there is no obvious reason or moti-
vation to consider nonlinear GARCH models such as the GJR-GARCH model of Glosten, Jagannathan and
Runkle (1993) to allow for different effects of positive and negative unexpected returns εi,t on conditional
volatility.
11Alternative models that allow for time-varying correlations are developed in Pelletier (in press) and
Silvennoinen and Tera¨svirta (2005), assuming that the correlations switch back and forth between a limited
number of values, according to an unobserved Markov-Switching process or according to the value of
observed exogenous variables, respectively. Hafner et al. (2005) generalize the latter approach by combining
(2)-(1) with univariate GARCH models for the conditional volatility. We refer to Bauwens et al. (in
press) for a comprehensive survey of multivariate GARCH models. An interesting alternative approach to
modelling dependence and changes therein is by means of copulas, see Patton (in press) for an application
to exchange rate returns.
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We are particularly interested in examining the possibility of structural changes in the
unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations due to (decisions concerning) the
introduction of the euro. For that purpose, we extend the DCC model to allow for breaks
in σ2i in (6) and Q in (7). The most general model that we consider in the next section
allows for two breaks in both the unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations.
This model is obtained by replacing σ2i and Q with σ
2




i1I[t ≤ τ1] + σ
2
i2I[τ1 < t ≤ τ2] + σ
2
i3I[τ2 < t], (9)
Qt = Q1I[t ≤ τ1] +Q2I[τ1 < t ≤ τ2] +Q3I[τ2 < t], (10)
where I[A] is the indicator function for the event A, and τ1 and τ2 denote the break-points
with τ1 < τ2. These change-points can be either fixed a priori or left unspecified and
estimated along with the other parameters in the model.
The attractive feature of the DCC model is that estimation of the parameters in the
model can be performed sequentially in three steps. First, estimate the (univariate) models
for the conditional means µit for the individual series rit, i = 1, . . . , N . Second, estimate
the univariate GARCH(1,1) models to obtain estimates of the conditional variances σ2it.
Here, σ2i in the specification given in (6) can be replaced by the sample variance of the
residuals εˆit = rit− µˆit. Similarly, in the specification with breaks in unconditional volatil-
ities, volatility targeting can still be employed by replacing σ2ij , j = 1, 2, 3, in (9) with
their sample analogues. Third, estimate the parameters in the model for Rt. “Correla-






t of the standardized residuals zˆt ≡ Sˆ
−1
t εˆt. Again, if breaks in the unconditional
correlations are incorporated as in (10), sample analogues of Qj , j = 1, 2, 3, can be used.
This imposes the restriction that the unconditional correlations as implied by the model
equal the unconditional sample correlations, and reduces the number of parameters to be
estimated in the second step to two, namely γ and δ. See Engle and Sheppard (2001)
for analysis of the properties of the three-step estimation procedure in this context. Due
to the sequential estimation of the model parameters, inference becomes a nontrivial is-
sue, because the standard errors of the correlation parameters depend on the estimates
of the conditional mean and variances. Engle (2002) provides general expressions for the
necessary adjustments to the third step covariance matrix to take into account the un-
certainty of the first and second steps. However, this does not allow for computation of
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quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) standard errors that are robust to the violation of the
assumption of normality in (3), as developed in Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Given
that this may be relevant for our exchange rate series, we decide to estimate all parameters
in the model jointly, such that QML standard errors can be obtained. This is not problem-
atic given that the dimension of our exchange rate series is reasonably small (N = 5), that
we can use simple models for the conditional mean µt, and that we employ both volatility
targeting and correlation targeting.12
5 Empirical results
We estimate the DCC model discussed in the previous section for the five-dimensional
vector of daily exchange rate returns, rt = (CHFt,EURt,GBPt,NOKt,SEKt)
′.13 To de-
termine an appropriate specification for the conditional mean µt, we start out with testing
for cointegration among the exchange rates, but find no evidence thereof. In addition,
none of the exchange rate returns series exhibits significant autocorrelation, such that we
set µt equal to a constant.
We estimate ten different DCC models with structural changes in volatilities and corre-
lations, by varying the number, the type and the location of the breaks. First, we estimate
the standard DCC model without breaks as given in (6)-(8). Second, we estimate six
models with a single break in the unconditional volatilities σ2i only, in the unconditional
correlations Q only, or in both, with the change occurring either at December 15, 1996 or
at January 1, 1999. Finally, we estimate three models with two breaks occurring at both
these dates, and affecting only the unconditional volatilities, or only the unconditional cor-
relations, or both. For all ten specifications, we also estimate the corresponding constant
conditional correlation (CCC) model of Bollerslev (1990), which sets Qt = Qt for all t in
(7) or, equivalently, Rt = Rt for all t in (4).
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results, by showing the log-likelihood values for the
CCC and DCCmodels, together with the estimates of the parameters γ and δ governing the
correlation dynamics in the DCC model (7). These lead to several interesting conclusions.
12The derivation of standard errors of the unconditional covariance matrix that is used for correlation
targeting has not been worked out yet, at least not in analytic form. In the univariate context of volatility
targeting in a GARCH(1,1) model, Kristensen and Linton (2004) propose to use a Newey-West type
estimator, which we conjecture could also be used in the multivariate context, although its convergence
rate is quite slow. We leave improvement of this approach open for future research.
13The analysis was also performed using bivariate models for all possible exchange rate pairs. This led
to qualitatively and quantitatively similar results, which are available in full detail upon request.
15
First, conditional correlations are time-varying, given the very large differences between
the log-likelihood values of the DCC models and their CCC counterparts, irrespective of
the specification of structural breaks in unconditional volatilities and correlations.
Second, allowing for structural breaks in unconditional volatilities and correlations
considerably improves the fit of the model. Comparing the log-likelihood values for models
with a single break, it appears that the most important change in correlations occurred
in December 1996, while for volatilities the break in January 1999 was more important.
The log-likelihood values of the models with two breaks again are considerably higher
than those of the one-break models, suggesting that allowing for two structural changes is
warranted.
Third, structural breaks in unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations
both appear to be important, as the model with break(s) in both substantially improves
the fit compared to the models with break(s) in either volatilities or correlations alone. We
remark that all improvements in fit due to allowing for breaks in unconditional volatilities
and correlations mentioned above are statistically significant when tested formally using
likelihood ratio statistics.
Fourth, and finally, allowing for structural breaks in correlations decreases the persis-
tence of conditional correlations, as the estimate of δ declines if one or two breaks are
included. The reduction from 0.968, the largest estimate of δ, to 0.938, the estimate in the
model with two breaks in volatilities and in correlations, may not appear to be all that
large, but it does imply a substantial decline in persistence of shocks εt to the conditional
correlations. For example, the half-life of shocks is reduced from 22 to 11 days.
Figure 2 plots the estimated conditional variances from the univariate GARCH(1,1)
models with two breaks in unconditional volatility, together with the level of σ2it. Simi-
larly, Figures 3-5 display the estimated conditional correlations from the DCC model with
two breaks in unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations, together with the
corresponding elements from Qt. By construction, the unconditional volatilities and un-
conditional correlations in these graphs are (almost) identical to the numbers presented in
Table 1.
In addition to the sizeable breaks in the unconditional correlations, several large swings
in the conditional correlations are worth noting. For example, the CHF-EUR conditional
correlation declined substantially during the third quarter of 1997. This might be related to
the Asian financial crises, particularly the resulting massive capital flight from individuals
16
in affected countries to Swiss bank accounts. The Swiss banks of course have a strong
reputation worldwide as a safe haven for capital, due to their strict customer secrecy
policy among others. The fact that these unique characteristics of Swiss banks are not
shared by euro countries’ banks might explain why countries in the euro area did not share
the Swiss experience in attracting capital from Asia during the crisis. This situation might
explain the all-time low CHF-EUR conditional correlation. A similar downward jump in
CHF-EUR conditional correlation occurred in the third quarter of 2001, possibly linked to
the WTC attack on September 11 and the subsequent war on terror.
The correlations between the British pound and all other currencies dropped substan-
tially around mid-2000. This apparently followed the fall of the pound’s effective exchange
rate by around 12.5% against the US dollar in May 2000, completely eliminating the gains
made by the pound over the previous six months. Apart from the period when the British
pound left the ERM in 1992, this was the largest one-month change in its exchange rate
against the US dollar since 1986. As this depreciation was not shared by other currencies,
all correlations with the pound considerably dropped off.
Notable swings are also observed in all correlations with the Norwegian krone in 1998.
These declines are obviously related to the sharp depreciation of the krone following the
financial crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil. Given the heavy reliance of Norway on oil and
gas exports, the weaker global demand due to the crises instigated the fall in commodity
prices (including oil), which subsequently worsened the terms of trade and depreciated the
exchange rate. As discussed in Section 2.1.3 Norges Bank responded by raising interest rate
several times and undertaking extensive and persistent foreign exchange interventions. The
resulting fluctuations of the krone were furthermore exacerbated by speculation, hedging
and portfolio shifts in financial markets. These unfortunate events, together with Norway’s
unique economic characteristics compared to other European countries, make that all
correlations with NOK weakened to an unusual extent.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
We perform four robustness checks to validate and substantiate our empirical results as
described above. First, we examine whether a priori imposing the breaks in unconditional
volatilities and correlations to occur at December 15, 1996 and January 1, 1999 was ap-
propriate. On the one hand, they are obvious break date ‘candidates’ given the important
economic events that took place at these dates. On the other hand, it may be that the
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volatility and correlation changes actually occurred at different points in time. For exam-
ple, the introduction of the euro was decided and announced well before January 1999 and
financial market participants may have changed their behavior already before this date.
To address this issue, we treat the break dates τ1 and τ2 as unknown or, put differently,
we consider them as unknown parameters. Joint estimation of the two change-points can
in principle be done by means of a two-dimensional grid search over τ1 and τ2, using a
pre-determined set T of ‘allowable’ break dates. However, in our case this is computa-
tionally prohibitive given the complexity of the model and the length of the time series.
We therefore estimate the two break-points sequentially as follows.14 We first estimate
DCC models with a single break in the unconditional volatilities and correlations for all
possible break-points in the inner 80% of the sample, that is between January 1, 1995 and
December 31, 2002, approximately. Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows the resulting log likelihood
values, from which we observe that the maximum (which delivers the estimate of the break
date) occurs just before December 15, 1996. Formal test statistics for a break in volatili-
ties and correlations occurring at an unknown point in time can be constructed from this
series of log likelihood values, see Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994), and
Chu (1995). These convincingly reject the null hypothesis of no break. Next, we estimate
DCC models with two breaks, fixing one of the breaks to occur at December 15, 1996 while
the other break occurs at an unknown point in time, and requiring that at least 10% of
the available subsamples are before and after each break. The sequence of log-likelihood
values shown in panel (b) of Figure 6 shows a clear maximum very close to January 1,
1999. Again, formal test statistics indicate that this second break is statistically signifi-
cant. Based on the above analysis we conclude that imposing the breaks in unconditional
volatilities and correlations to occur at the time of the formal decision to proceed with the
euro in December 1996 and at the time of the actual introduction in January 1999 was
appropriate.
Second, one may question whether the appropriate number of breaks indeed is two,
or whether more breaks should be allowed for. We address this issue by estimating DCC
models with three breaks in unconditional volatilities and correlations. We fix two of the
breaks to occur at December 15, 1996 and January 1, 1999, while the third break occurs at
an unknown point in time, as described above. This results in the sequence of log-likelihood
14Bai and Perron (1998) established the asymptotic properties of this sequential approach, demonstrating
consistency and efficiency.
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values shown in panel (c) of Figure 6. We observe several local maxima (and hence
candidate break dates) around July 1998, March 2000, and February 2002. The likelihood
values at these points are approximately equal and indicate a substantial improvement in fit
relative to the model with two breaks. However, inspecting the resulting (un)conditional
correlations, it appears that these potential third breaks are mostly currency-specific.
As can also be seen from Figures 3-5, the break in July 1998 is relevant mostly for the
Norwegian krone and to a lesser extent for the Swedish krona, as the correlations involving
one of these two currencies experienced sharp declines. The probable cause for these large
abrupt changes has been discussed before. The apparent break in March 2000 is caused
mainly by the sharp depreciation of the British pound leading to sharp but temporary
declines in correlation of with the other currencies, in particular with the euro and Swiss
Franc. Similarly, increases in correlation of the British pound are responsible for the
break in February 2002, although in addition we observe a considerable reduction in the
correlation between the Norwegian krone and the Swedish krona around the time. In sum,
it seems that allowing for more breaks may be worthwhile, but that any such additional
breaks are not common across all currencies but rather currency-specific.
Third, it might be argued that a gradual change in unconditional volatilities and cor-
relations may be more realistic than the instantaneous jumps that we have used so far. To
explore this possibility, we estimate a DCC model with such gradual changes by replacing
σ2it in (9) and Qt in (10) with
σ2it = σ
2
i1(1−G(t; ζ1, τ1)) + σ
2
i2G(t; ζ1, τ1)(1−G(t; ζ2, τ2)) + σ
2
i3G(t; ζ1, τ1)G(t; ζ2, τ2),
(11)
Qt = Q1(1−G(t; ζ1, τ1)) +Q2G(t; ζ1, τ1)(1−G(t; ζ2, τ2)) +Q3G(t; ζ1, τ1)G(t; ζ2, τ2),
(12)
where
G(t; ζj , τj) = (1 + exp(−ζj(t− τj)))
−1, ζj > 0, (13)
j = 1, 2, are logistic functions that change from 0 to 1 as t increases. The parameter ζj de-
termines the smoothness of the change, with larger values of ζj implying faster transitions.
Note that if ζj → ∞, the logistic function G(t; ζj , τj) becomes indistinguishable from the
indicator function I[t ≤ τj ]. Hence, the smooth transition DCC model nests the DCC
model with discrete changes as a special case. For identification purposes, we impose the
restriction τ1 < τ2, such that the unconditional correlations change from Q1 via Q2 to Q3
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as time goes by.15 An unfortunate feature of allowing for gradual changes is that volatil-
ity targeting and correlation targeting cannot be used to reduce the number of unknown
parameters. Hence, we estimate the unconditional volatilities σi,j for i = 1, . . . , N and
j = 1, 2, 3 and the unconditional correlation matrices Qj , j = 1, 2, 3, along with the other
parameters in the model (giving a total of 57 parameters to be estimated).16 Imposing
the changes in volatilities and correlations to be centered around December 15, 1996 and
January 1, 1999 as before, the resulting estimates of the smoothness parameters in the
logistic transition functions (13) are quite large: ζˆ1 = 190 and ζˆ2 = 506. These imply
that the first change takes about six months from start to finish, while the second change
occurred almost instantaneously. As a further check, we also estimate bivariate DCC
models with smooth structural changes. For most currency pairs the changes occur quite
rapidly, as can be seen from Figures 3-5 where the resulting unconditional correlations are
shown. Exceptions include pairs involving the British pound for which the second change
in unconditional correlation materializes rather gradually, especially with the Swiss franc
and the euro. The same holds for the NOK-SEK pair. Generalizing the smooth transition
DCC model to allow for correlation-specific speeds of change is problematic however, as
it becomes difficult to guarantee that the resulting unconditional correlation matrix Qt in
(12) is positive semi-definite for all t; see Silvennoinen and Tera¨svirta (2005) for further
discussion.
Fourth, the DCC model may be deemed restrictive in the sense that all conditional
correlations among the exchange rates are assumed to follow the same dynamics as deter-
mined by the parameters γ and δ in (7). To examine whether this is relevant for our daily
exchange rate returns, we estimate the semi-generalized DCC-GARCH model developed
by Hafner and Franses (2003), which allows for asset-specific news impact parameters by
replacing (7) with
Qt = (1− γ
2 − δ)Q+ γγ′  zt−1z
′
t−1 + δQt−1, (14)
where  denotes the Hadamard product and γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γN )
′ now is an (N × 1)
15Multivariate GARCH models with smoothly changing unconditional correlations are also considered by
Berben and Jansen (in press) and Silvennoinen and Tera¨svirta (2005). However, in both studies, this model
is developed as an extension of the CCC-model and DCC-type dynamics in the conditional correlations are
not allowed for.
16In the estimation procedure, we enforce that Qt is a genuine correlation matrix by taking the Choleski
decompositions of Qj = PjP
′
j , j = 1, 2, 3, where Pj is a lower triangular matrix and imposing constraints
on the non-zero elements of Pj that lead to ones on the diagonal of Qj and automatically give off-diagonal
elements between –1 and 1; see Pelletier (in press) for details.
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vector. Note that in this model the effect of the product zi,t−1zj,t−1 on qijt (and hence
on the conditional correlation ρijt is given by γiγj .
17 Estimating the 10 possible models
with the different number, types and location of break(s) that we consider, we generally
find a modest improvement in the log-likelihood values and moderate differences in the
coefficients γi across currencies. For example, allowing for two breaks in both unconditional
volatilities and correlations, the log-likelihood value for the SGDCC model is equal to
−3912.48, compared to −3919.11 for the corresponding DCC model. Hence, a formal
likelihood ratio statistic for testing the restrictions γ1 = γ2 = . . . = γ5 would allow rejection
of the DCC model at conventional significance levels. The estimates of γi (with QML
standard errors in parentheses) are equal to 0.195 (0.017), 0.201 (0.014), 0.146 (0.015),
0.201 (0.014) and 0.180 (0.016) for CHF, EUR, GBP, NOK and SEK, respectively.18 Hence,
we conclude that there is some scope for generalizing the DCC model to allow for different
dynamics in the conditional correlations, but that the standard model is sufficiently flexible
to address the issue of breaks in unconditional correlations.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has provided convincing evidence for structural breaks in unconditional cor-
relations between the British pound, Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Swiss franc and
the euro exchange rates (against the US dollar) during the period 1994-2003. Using an
extension of the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model, we find that such breaks
occurred both at the time the formal decision to proceed with the euro was made in De-
cember 1996 and at the time of the actual introduction in January 1999. In particular, we
document that most correlations experienced substantial declines during the intermittent
period.
Our results have clear implications for financial decision making. For example, ade-
quate currency risk management requires accurate modelling of volatility and correlation
patterns of exchange rates. Our analysis demonstrates that allowing for time-varying con-
ditional volatilities and correlations by means of a standard DCC model may not be suffi-
cient in this respect. Incorporating occasional structural breaks in unconditional volatilities
and correlations may be necessary.
17See Cappiello et al. (2003) for other generalizations of the DCC model.
18These may be compared with the square root of the estimate of γ in the DCC model with two volatility
and correlation breaks, which is equal to 0.181.
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Table 1: Exchange rate returns - summary statistics
Correlations
Currency Mean StD Skew Kurt CHF EUR GBP NOK SEK
January 1, 1994-December 31, 2003
CHF −1.696 11.43 −0.459 5.769 1.000 0.925 0.622 0.789 0.668
EUR −1.123 9.91 −0.410 5.454 1.000 0.679 0.849 0.760
GBP −1.822 7.59 −0.190 4.767 1.000 0.586 0.530
NOK −1.083 9.81 −0.133 6.004 1.000 0.750
SEK −1.359 10.16 −0.206 4.383 1.000
January 1, 1994-December 15, 1996
CHF −4.223 12.16 −0.696 8.707 1.000 0.947 0.673 0.934 0.567
EUR −4.044 8.87 −0.563 9.639 1.000 0.766 0.986 0.635
GBP −3.898 6.92 −0.162 6.431 1.000 0.760 0.519
NOK −5.102 8.94 −0.609 9.746 1.000 0.648
SEK −6.857 9.33 −0.150 4.470 1.000
December 16, 1996-December 31, 1998
CHF 2.626 11.40 −0.448 4.473 1.000 0.896 0.472 0.566 0.597
EUR 3.699 8.60 −0.431 3.669 1.000 0.562 0.683 0.704
GBP 0.168 7.91 0.034 3.432 1.000 0.309 0.387
NOK 7.977 10.64 0.062 6.484 1.000 0.725
SEK 8.789 10.06 −0.362 3.960 1.000
January 1, 1999-December 31, 2003
CHF −1.956 11.00 −0.270 3.678 1.000 0.941 0.663 0.812 0.761
EUR −1.353 10.92 −0.344 4.315 1.000 0.686 0.858 0.832
GBP −1.406 7.84 −0.299 4.629 1.000 0.625 0.590
NOK −2.381 9.94 −0.045 4.120 1.000 0.809
SEK −2.227 10.65 −0.179 4.426 1.000
Note: The table reports summary statistics of daily exchange rate returns. StD denotes standard deviation,
Skew is skewness and Kurt is kurtosis. Mean returns and standard deviations are given in annualized
percentage points.
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Table 2: Estimated DCC models for daily exchange rate returns
Model L(CCC) L(DCC) γ δ
NB -5110.73 -4155.50 0.030 0.953
(0.003) (0.006)
SBV(12-15-1996) -5045.71 -4118.91 0.029 0.968
(0.003) (0.003)
SBV(12-31-1998) -5078.98 -4125.98 0.029 0.968
(0.002) (0.003)
SBC(12-15-1996) -4405.37 -3997.88 0.032 0.950
(0.004) (0.007)
SBC(12-31-1998) -5010.67 -4156.61 0.029 0.968
(0.002) (0.003)
SBVC(12-15-1996) -4352.76 -3966.83 0.033 0.947
(0.004) (0.008)
SBVC(12-31-1998) -4954.04 -4126.07 0.029 0.968
(0.002) (0.003)
TBV -5053.79 -4106.60 0.029 0.968
(0.003) (0.003)
TBC -4300.82 -3972.40 0.031 0.944
(0.003) (0.008)
TBVC -4217.67 -3919.11 0.033 0.938
(0.004) (0.009)
Note: The table reports summary statistics of DCC models estimated for daily
exchange rate returns over the period January 1, 1994-December 31, 2003.
Bollerslev-Wooldridge type QML standard errors of γ and δ are given in paren-
theses. NB denotes the model with no structural breaks; XBV (XBC) denotes
models with structural breaks in the unconditional volatilities (correlations) and
no breaks in the unconditional correlations (volatilities); XBVC denotes models
with structural breaks in both the unconditional volatilities and in the uncon-
ditional correlations; X=S or T depending on whether a single (S) or two (T)
structural breaks are allowed for.
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Table 3: Estimated GARCH(1,1) models for daily exchange rate returns
Currency NB SBVC(12-15-1996) TBVC
αi βi αi βi αi βi
CHF 0.047 0.938 0.054 0.909 0.053 0.899
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.020)
EUR 0.060 0.928 0.069 0.896 0.072 0.883
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.024)
GBP 0.048 0.926 0.062 0.881 0.066 0.865
(0.015) (0.030) (0.018) (0.047) (0.018) (0.050)
NOK 0.058 0.929 0.066 0.900 0.068 0.889
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.027)
SEK 0.059 0.923 0.066 0.901 0.066 0.897
(0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022)
Note: The table reports summary statistics of DCC models estimated for daily exchange rate
returns over the period January 1, 1994-December 31, 2003. Bollerslev-Wooldridge type QML
standard errors of αi and βi are given in parentheses. NB denotes the model with no structural
breaks; XBV (XBC) denotes models with structural breaks in the unconditional volatilities (cor-
relations) and no breaks in the unconditional correlations (volatilities); XBVC denotes models
with structural breaks in both the unconditional volatilities and in the unconditional correla-
tions; X=S or T depending on whether a single (S) or two (T) structural breaks are allowed
for.
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(a) Volatilities (b) CHF
(c) EUR (d) GBP
(e) NOK (f) SEK
Figure 1: Nonparametric volatility estimates (panel (a)) and correlation estimates (panels
(b)-(f)) for daily exchange rate returns over the period January 1, 1994-December 31,
2003, obtained from (1) using a quartic kernel function with bandwidth h = 1.
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(a) CHF (b) EUR
(c) GBP (d) NOK
(e) SEK
Figure 2: Conditional volatilities of daily exchange rate returns in GARCH(1,1) model
with breaks in unconditional volatilities occurring at December 15, 1996 and January 1,





Figure 3: Dynamic conditional correlation between daily exchange rate returns in DCC
model with breaks in unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations occurring
at December 15, 1996 and January 1, 1999 (solid line). Short-dashed lines are uncondi-






Figure 4: Dynamic conditional correlation between daily exchange rate returns in DCC
model with breaks in unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations occurring
at December 15, 1996 and January 1, 1999 (solid line). Short-dashed lines are uncondi-







Figure 5: Dynamic conditional correlation between daily exchange rate returns in DCC
model with breaks in unconditional volatilities and unconditional correlations occurring
at December 15, 1996 and January 1, 1999 (solid line). Short-dashed lines are uncondi-






Figure 6: Log-likelihood value for different break dates in DCC model with a single break
(panel (a)), with two breaks where one of the breaks occurs at December 15, 1996 (panel
(b)), and with three breaks where two of the breaks occur at December 15, 1996 and
January 1, 1999 (panel (c)).
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